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I. INTRODUCTION  
 Twenty-three years ago, Israeli fighter pilots whistled relaxingly in the relative 
calm of the 100-foot low-level ingress as they raced toward a date with destiny and a 
profound statement on global nuclear proliferation.1  In less than 90 seconds, eight Israeli 
F-16s demolished the Osiraq nuclear reactor.  Before exercising this military option, 
Israeli policymakers attempted seven years of diplomatic, overt, and covert actions to 
stop Iraq’s nuclear plans.  Concurrent with its non-military efforts, Israeli leaders planned 
a state of the art military operation.  The execution and timing of this strike held marked 
political risks together with the obvious military dangers.   
 In light of the recent events in Iraq, the Osiraq strike is important to current and 
future counterproliferation actions.  Putting the Osiraq strike in perspective will confirm 
measures other nations may take before resorting to military counterproliferation actions.  




 Israel’s attack on Osiraq was a bold preventive strike.  It reinforced Israel’s 
doctrine regarding nuclear weapons.  According to Menachem Begin, “Israel would not 
tolerate any nuclear weapons in the region.”2  Israel still enforces this Begin Doctrine 
today.  The thesis determines lasting lessons from the first attack.  These lessons are 
important as the world anticipates an Iranian nuclear weapon in several years.3 
 The purpose of the thesis is to determine the strategic implications of the 1981 
Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor complex.  What are the lasting effects of 
using non-conventional weapons as a means of counterproliferation against a nuclear 
                                                 
1Personal interview, 5 Aug 2004, with retired IAF Colonel Dov ‘Doobi’ Yoffe at his home in Israel after 
viewing the Heads Up Display (HUD) video of the 7 June 1981 strike.  The video was a compilation of all 
F-16 aircraft that participated in the raid.  It included take-off, ingress, pre-strike maneuvering, footage of 
the attack, post-strike defensive maneuvering, and egress back to Israel.  Doobi whistled to relax, while 
others talked to themselves or verbally rehearsed critical portions of the attack. 
2Quoted in Avner Cohen, "The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate," in 
International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, ed. Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (Washington 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies, 1995), 85. 
3 Israel Weighs Strike on Iran (26 September 2003) [Internet] (JANE'S INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, 2003 
[cited 15 April 2004]); available from http://80-www4.janes.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/. 
2 
threat?  The strike “killed” the Iraqi nuclear capability in the short term, but did this 
action diminish the long-term nuclear threat to Israel?  This watershed event in the 
Middle East created new regional military and political realities,4 forcing nuclear 
proliferators to harden nuclear facilities that increased the cost to any regional country of 
going nuclear.  However, the long-term consequences of the attack are global.  A 
preventive strike would no longer be so easy to get away with, nor would the required 
intelligence assessments about nuclear proliferators be as easy, due to a near universal 
emphasis on denial and deception following the Osiraq raid.  This paper identifies several 
lasting ramifications United States policymakers contend with resulting from this strike. 
 The overarching question of this thesis is whether the Israeli Strike on Osiraq was 
an effective counter to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.  Evaluating the strategic factors 
that drove Israel to attack Osiraq frames the problem.  How and when Israeli 
policymakers carried out the strike reveals the empirical results.  Finally, the short and 
long-term military, political, and diplomatic results paint a more complete picture of the 
strategic implications of this strike. 
 The thesis argues that the Osiraq strike had two major purposes.  First, it slowed 
down the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.  Second, it achieved domestic political benefits 
at a critical juncture.  The strike had several unintended consequences, however.  Other 
nuclear proliferators hardened their nuclear facilities or sought redundant facilities.  
These efforts reduced the time succeeding preventive strikes would buy.  Furthermore, 
Saddam Hussein did not sacrifice his goal of developing nuclear weapons, but he did 
significantly change tactics to achieve this goal.  Although the preventive strike has 
several short-term benefits, this action demonstrated that deterrence is not a long-term 
effect of such strikes.  In fact, it is more likely that a country will restart a nuclear 





                                                 
4"Interagency Intelligence Assessment; Implications of Israeli Attack on Iraq," in Declassified Government 
Intelligence Assessment via internet http://www.foia.cia.gov/, ed. Central Intelligence Agency (Washington 




 My thesis uncovers new information from personal interviews about the Osiraq 
mission and the domestic political interaction preceding the strike.  Aside from these 
first-hand sources, the thesis draws from select books on the subject.  It also incorporates 
numerous scholarly articles, government documents, recently declassified information, 
foreign policy speeches, and media sources worldwide. 
 
C. KEY FINDINGS 
 
 This thesis confirms the short-term benefits of a successful preventive strike.  It 
also illustrates the long-term drawbacks a nation must be ready for prior to ordering a 
preventive strike.  A successful preventive strike, especially a conventional weapons 
strike on a non-conventional sight like Osiraq, serves to buy time for the striker.  In the 
case of Osiraq, the first modern conventional strike on a nuclear reactor, the strike bought 
Israel at least five to ten years of reprieve from an Iraqi nuclear threat.  Another side 
effect of a preventive strike is the concomitant international media blitz the strike draws.  
The media results are both positive and negative.  In the long-term however, a preventive 
strike such as Osiraq may reinforce a state’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons.  Such was 
the case with Iraq. 
 The second conclusion of this thesis points to the importance of the diplomatic 
process of nonproliferation.  Israeli decision makers attempted to counter Iraq’s nuclear 
plans diplomatically for seven years before concluding a military option was the only 
appropriate solution.  Israeli policymakers justified the strike based on their perception of 
apparent U.S. indifference toward Iraq’s nuclear proliferation.  U.S. diplomats had many 
more tools at their disposal to allay Israeli fears that went unused. 
 The next preventive strike against a nuclear proliferator will neither be as 
successful nor buy as much time as the first.  Other nations seeking a nuclear option also 
have learned valuable lessons from the strike on Osiraq.  Second, the media backlash 
after a strike will radicalize the proliferator’s stance toward accomplishing the goal of 
going nuclear.  Third, as the global hegemon, U.S. decision makers should balance the 
4 
weight of nonproliferation system management wisely against valuable alliance 
considerations.  Decision makers should make every attempt to work within the confines 
of current global constructs for stability.  If this means taking diplomatic and economic 
actions against proliferators or pushing Israel to abandon the Begin doctrine, then quick 
decisive action is best done through International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) or 
United Nations (UN) auspices with full United States backing.  Lastly, U.S. leaders must 
weigh the potential misperception between slow, steady pressure to reverse proliferation, 
and Israel’s view of state survival.  If U.S. policymakers fail to take decisive action, 




 This thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter I sets the stage by introducing the 
dilemma of proliferation in the Middle East and the opposing Israeli Begin doctrine.  This 
chapter briefly covers Israel’s Osiraq strike, and its importance for current proliferation 
matters in the region.  The chapter then covers methodology, key findings, and 
organization. 
 Chapter II illustrates how key Israeli decision makers decided to attack by 
reviewing Israeli defense principles.  Israel predominantly relies on deterrence, 
autonomy, preparation, and aggressiveness as defense principles.  Historically, these 
principles work well to dissuade hostility against Israel.  However, Israel’s diplomatic, 
overt, and covert efforts did not dissuade the Saddam Hussein regime from attempting to 
build a nuclear weapon. 
 Chapter III delivers the fine points of the attack itself and several previously 
uncovered facets of the strike.  Israel faced significant domestic political pressures yet 
still employed sophisticated planning and execution well beyond the ability of its 
neighbors.  The implementation of this strike speaks clearly of Israeli resolve regarding 
counterproliferation.  Israel’s past ability to employ western-style planning and execution 
lends credibility to Israel’s ability to execute advanced military options against nuclear 
proliferators now. 
5 
 Chapter IV reviews the physical effects and political aftermath of the Osiraq 
strike.  A distinct comparison between short-term goals and the long-term effects is 
readily apparent in the post Operation Iraqi-Freedom environment of 2004.  Previous 
literature focuses specifically on the short-term benefits of preventive strikes like Osiraq.  
This chapter also describes the domestic and regional ramifications of the attack. 
 Chapter V summarizes the paper’s findings and identifies several policy 
recommendations regarding preventive strikes.  It also gives a broad perspective on the 
applicability of the Begin Doctrine in current regional affairs and potential U.S. 
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II ANATOMY OF A DECISION 
 A dramatic chain of events began thirty years ago when Saddam Hussein 
approached Jacques Chirac requesting the purchase of a French nuclear reactor.  Hussein 
perceived that Iraq, an oil rich nation, needed a nuclear weapon to balance against Israel 
and as a status symbol.  Israeli policymakers scrutinized the events altogether differently.  
According to Israeli government official and scholar, Uri Bar-Joseph, unlike the 
superpowers’ relationship of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) that stabilized a 
nuclear balance of power, Israel’s leadership believed that a similar situation in the 
Middle East was a remote possibility “because of Israel’s vulnerability and the nature of 
the Arab regimes-especially that of Saddam Hussein.”5  This chapter explores the 
strategic factors that lead Israel to attack the Osiraq nuclear reactor.  It first examines 
Israel’s strategic doctrine regarding threats in the region.  Second, it asks what the 
perceived threat from the Saddam Hussein regime was and whether this threat was 
credible and imminent.  Third, the chapter examines the means and methods Israeli 
decision makers employed to prevent Iraq from developing a nuclear weapon.  Although 
the nation of Israel was oversensitive to threats, its policymakers correctly perceived the 
threat from Saddam Hussein’s regime.  Fourth, the chapter shows the failure of Israel’s 
overt, covert, and diplomatic actions to dissuade Iraq from obtaining nuclear weapons 
prior to the Osiraq strike. 
 
A. SETTING THE STAGE  
 
 Israel is in a dangerous neighborhood.  Several factors influence how Israel copes 
with emerging threats.  The most critical of these factors are Israeli defense principles 
and inherent tactical dilemmas.  Israel’s leadership creates doctrine that influences how it 
handles emerging threats.  As Israel developed defense principles for nuclear weapons, it 
found several inherent problems with conventional defense principles. 
 
 
                                                 
5Amos Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 2nd ed. (London; 
Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), xl. 
8 
1. Israeli Decision Makers 
 An elite group of policymakers has led Israel.  These men and women have very 
similar backgrounds and ideological values.  According to Efraim Inbar, “Israeli decision 
making in defense matters has always been extremely centralized and has remained the 
coveted privilege of the very few.  The defense minister is the most important decision 
maker.  He has almost exclusive authority within his ministry.”6  This fact was especially 
true for Prime Minister Menachem Begin after Ezer Weizman resigned.  Begin took over 
the job of Defense Minister as well as Prime Minister after Weizman resigned as Defense 
Minister.  This made it much simpler to carry through with the decision to strike Osiraq.  
It also narrowed the amount of dissenting opinion the cabinet heard. 
 The policy-making elite are familiar with military affairs.  Indeed, most of the 
members of Begin’s cabinet fought side by side in Israel’s wars.  Inbar states for the 
period 1973-1996, “Most decision makers, grew up in the defense establishment, and had 
a good grasp of national security problems.”7  During and after the time of the strike on 
Osiraq, most defense decision-makers got their start in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
and moved to politics once their military careers finished.  This continuity gave Israel a 
relatively constant set of principles for its defense doctrines. 
 
2. Israeli Defense Principles 
 Israel relies on a steady set of values regarding its defense.  Decision-makers 
believe deterrence, autonomy, preparation, and aggression each pay dividends in the 
nation’s defense.  The most critical element is a strong deterrence stance without enticing 
an enemy into further aggression.8  According to Inbar, “A strong Israel is necessary for 
its acceptance as an unchallengeable fact, but Israeli military strength and the occasional 
use of force needed to maintain a reputation for toughness and readiness to fight could 
generate traditional fears in the Arab world regarding Israeli expansionism.”9  Prime 
                                                 
6Efraim Inbar, "Israeli National Security, 1973-96," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 555, no. 1 (January 1998): 63. 
7Ibid.: 64. 
8Efraim Inbar indicates a similar but fundamentally different set of strategic elements.  However, 
deterrence is at the heart of both and drives most other parts of Israel’s Defense Principles.  The Begin 
Doctrine is meant to deter Israel’s enemies.  However, it also forces Israel to remain prepared for any 
regional nuclear threat and speaks to Israel’s willingness to act autonomously if necessary.   
9Ibid.: 74. 
9 
Minister Begin acted upon this principle when he issued the directive that became Israel’s 
nuclear doctrine.  The Begin Doctrine is a clear order:  under no circumstances would 
Israel permit a neighboring state on terms of belligerency with Israel to construct a 
nuclear reactor that threatens the survival of the Jewish state.  This doctrine provides 
deterrence, preparation, and aggression to work and remains within Israel’s defense 
principles. 
 The introduction of weapons of mass destruction exacerbated the Israeli 
sensitivity to loss of life.  Even before the introduction of a nuclear threat, policymakers 
viewed the strategic environment with a much greater pessimism after the 1973 war.  
Inbar states, “The 1973 war…did not provide Israel with a sense of victory.  Israel 
suffered a painfully high number of casualties during the hostilities, and afterward it was 
isolated internationally.  It also shattered Israel’s confidence in the IDF and caused the 
fundamentals of Israeli strategic thinking to be questioned.”10  This lack of confidence 
forced decision makers to choose overaggressive postures on several occasions and 
reinforced Israel’s need to act autonomously. 
 
3. Tactical Dilemma 
 As Iraq sought a nuclear capability in 1974, Israeli leaderships’ strategic outlook 
was pessimistic and confidence in the IDF faltered.  To Israeli policymakers, this 
shattered confidence combined with Israel’s natural weaknesses accentuated their 
susceptibility to attack.  Israel has very little geostrategic depth.  It is approximately 220 
miles long and 45 miles wide at its farthest points.  The population of neighboring states 
outnumbers Israel more than ten to one.  In the past, Israel’s military preparedness and 
autonomy allowed it to succeed on the conventional battlefield.  As Iraq grew closer to 
gaining a nuclear capability, however, it appeared conventional military deterrents, 
preparation, and autonomy would not overcome Israel’s lack of strategic depth in 




                                                 
10Inbar, "Israeli National Security, 1973-96," 63. 
10 
 This predicament forced Israel to compensate for weaknesses with alliances.  U.S.  
policymakers continually reaffirmed the alliance to allay any Israeli fears.  This statement 
from Secretary of State Alexander Haig after the raid typifies the kind of information that 
affirmed the alliance but also reaffirmed Israel’s need to be autonomous: 
The United States recognized the gaps in Western military capabilities in 
the region, and the fundamental strategic value of Israel, the strongest and 
most stable friend and ally the Unites States has in the Mideast.  
Consequently, the two countries must work together to counter the full 
range of threats that the Western world faces in the region.  While we may 
not always place the same emphasis on particular threats, we share a 
fundamental understanding that a strong, secure and vibrant Israel serves 
Western interests in the Middle East, We shall never deviate from that 
principle, for the success of our strategy depends thereupon.”11 
 
 Israel sought an ironclad guarantee against nuclear attack, but no ally could 
provide that guarantee.  In 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie informed Israeli 
Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, “In spite of being the leader of the West, the world’s 
greatest superpower did not wield unlimited power…also international bodies experience 
difficulty in effective supervision on nuclear activity, because nuclear materials are 
available from a variety of sources, not all subject to control.”12  Without the needed 
infallible pledge, Israel chose the Begin Doctrine as its choice of strategic doctrine 
against potential nuclear threats in the region.  It remains Israel’s choice in 2004. 
 
B. KNOW YOUR ENEMY 
 
 Saddam Hussein made Israel’s doctrine choice an easy selection.  His constant 
offensive rhetoric and abrasive foreign policy were clear signs of aggression.  It is critical 
to view the perceived threat Hussein’s regime caused in Israel with an equally important 
analysis of the credibility of that threat.  Iraqi technological progress provides clear 
indication that Israel’s perception matched the credibility of threat.  Iraq also proved its 
hostility toward Israel by remaining outside the 1949 Armistice agreement and not 
recognizing the legitimacy of Israel as a state.  Lastly, Saddam Hussein made it clear he 
                                                 
11Shelomoh Nakdimon, First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel Foiled Iraq's Attempt to Get the 
Bomb (New York: Summit Books, 1987), 273. 
12Ibid., 148. 
11 
would not hesitate to employ nuclear weapons if he possessed them.  These indicators 
show Israel faced a rising credible threat matched to an unhesitatingly hostile regime. 
 
1. Iraqi Technological Signs 
 Iraqi scientists were in the infancy stages of nuclear research in 1974.  Scientific 
experiments in their Soviet nuclear reactor did not explore the full capability of the 
research reactor.  According to Nakdimon, “The level of Iraq’s nuclear research at that 
time could not justify the acquisition of an Osiris reactor.  The Iraqis had barely begun to 
take advantage of the research possibilities offered by their Soviet reactor.  Their interests 
stemmed from its plutogenic [plutonium producing] traits.”13  Additionally, policymakers 
in the Soviet Union did not consent to releasing weapons grade uranium to Iraq along 
with the reactor it supplied.  This forced Iraq to search for a reactor with dual use 
purposes. 
 For Iraqi scientists, the two purposes of an Osiris type reactor were to maintain a 
legitimate scientific front while possessing the ability to harness nuclear energy for a 
weapon.  Legitimate purposes for nuclear reactors were primarily production of 
electricity.  Nakdimon states, “Had the Iraqis indeed desired an electric-power reactor, 
they could have applied for one of the newer American-designed models the French were 
now manufacturing.  But on learning that a gas-graphite reactor could not be supplied, the 
Iraqis showed no further interest, temporarily, in any French-built reactor.”14  Saddam 
Hussein pressured Jacques Chirac for a gas-graphite reactor and uranium enriched to at 
least ninety-three percent for Iraq’s nuclear reactor (figure 1). 15  To deliver such a 
reactor to Iraq, France had to supply an older reactor type.  Newer reactors were more 
efficient, less expensive, used Caramel (enriched to only twenty-thirty percent enriched 
uranium) fuel and offered greater safety.  Possessing an Osiris type reactor offered two 
primary benefits to Hussein:  its plutogenic traits offered him a potential source of 
weapons grade nuclear material and the fuel used to run Osiris also was weapons grade 
material. 
                                                 
13Ibid., 58. 
14Ibid., 54. 
15From: 1998 Strategic Assessment:  Engaging Power for Peace, Ch. 12 “Nuclear Weapons”, National 
Defense University, Washington, D.C., March 1998 
12 
 
Figure 1.   Saddam Hussein and Jacques Chirac in Nuclear laboratory 
 
2. Still at War 
 Iraq insisted on remaining in a state of war with Israel.  All other Arab states 
signed armistice agreements with Israel in 1949.  Iraq could not sign an armistice because 
it did not recognize Israel as a state.  Iraqi soldiers have participated in every war against 
Israel.  In 1969, Hussein ordered Iraqi Jews in Baghdad executed.  Additionally, he took 
every opportunity to remind the Iraqi people they were at war with Israel.  Nakdimon 
states, “In an interview published in the United States on May 16, 1977 Hussein stated, 
never shall we recognize Israel’s right to exist as an independent Zionist state.”  On 
October 24, 1978 one week prior to the ninth Arab summit an official statement from an 
Iraqi ambassador to India reaffirmed the continuing hostility, “Iraq does not accept the 
existence of a Zionist state in Palestine the only solution is war.”16  This state of affairs 
between the two countries did not allow any diplomatic contact and any interaction 
between the two came through a third party. 
                                                 
16See Nakdimon pages 79 and 97 for these two quotations.  There are multiple references inferring Iraq’s 
intent to remain at war with Israel and the Iraqi government’s stated intent of removing the Zionist entity 
from the Palestinian land.  Nakdimon’s most telling account of these facts are from a Kuwaiti newspaper, 
the a Siasia on 24 Mar 1978 [see p. 89-90 Nakdimon] 
13 
3. The Butcher of Baghdad 
 Israel witnessed Hussein’s repeated use of chemical weapons on his own people 
and fellow Arabs.  During the Iran-Iraq war, Israel observed Iraq’s merciless use of 
chemical weapons.  Hussein took no care in launching the deadly poison as long as he 
received benefit from its use.  Israel noted that Hussein’s use of these weapons were 
against people whom he professed not to hate.  How much more devastating would an 
attack be on those whom he professed to hate? 
 Policymakers in Israel were convinced the Iraqi government under Saddam 
Hussein would employ nuclear weapons if they possessed them.  Hussein and members 
of his regime also expressed this openly.  Immediately after the final negotiations on 
Osiraq, in a September 1975 interview, Hussein stated: “the Franco-Iraqi agreement was 
the first actual step in the production of an Arab atomic weapon, despite the fact that the 
declared purpose for the establishment of the reactor is not the production of atomic 
weapons.”17  Five years later, following two unsuccessful Iranian attempts to destroy the 
reactor, the Iraqi newspaper ath-Thawra quoted Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz, “The 
Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be used 
against Iran, but against the Zionist enemy.”18  For these myriad reasons, Israel correctly 
perceived the threat from Iraq’s nuclear program and foresaw with certainty that Saddam 
Hussein would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons on Israel. 
 
C. OUT OF OPTIONS 
 
 Israel used countless means and methods to prevent Iraq from developing a 
nuclear capability.  It planned each of these methods to delay or destroy Iraqi indigenous 
nuclear capability.  None of these methods proved able to stifle Saddam Hussein’s 
motivation to join the nuclear club.  Israel used overt methods consisting primarily of 
media reports and open contact with critical personnel.  It reportedly used several covert 
methods to influence those involved in the Iraqi reactor project.  Additionally, Israeli 
political leaders employed diplomatic tools to pressure the global community into 
                                                 
17Nakdimon, First Strike, 59. 
18Ibid., 156. 
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stopping Saddam Hussein’s nuclear programs.  These efforts failed to accomplish the 
overall task of dissuading Iraq from going nuclear. 
 The art of statecraft lies in manipulating international pressure to obtain an 
objective without resorting to violence.  Israel employed these schemes and processes for 
seven years before resorting to a military solution.  Many actions happened from 1974 to 
1981 that will never be known, but certainly, the most visible confirm the attempts and 
more importantly, the methods Israel used.19  Thus, this list is not all-inclusive, but it 
does cover the preponderance of means used to persuade Saddam Hussein to abandon his 
nuclear ambitions. 
 
1. Overt Methods 
 The primary overt method Israel used to influence international opinion was the 
media.  Israel also used academic routes to present the threat,20 but the most effective was 
through newspapers and magazines.  While charting the timeline for overt actions two 
specific events stand out:  the first is the January 1976 revelation of the potential Iraqi 
nuclear capability by the London Daily Mail; the second is the July 1980 Israeli cabinet 




London Daily Mail wrote, “‘Iraq is soon liable to achieve a capacity for 
producing nuclear weapons.  One of the most unstable states in the 
Arab world would be the largest and most advanced in the Middle 
East.’  The paper added that France would be powerless to impose 
effective control over the use to which the Iraqis would put it.” 
May 1977 Eliyahu Maicy, Paris correspondent for Ha’aretz uncovered a 
                                                 
19There are four books in English on this subject.  First Strike, Two Minutes over Baghdad, Bullseye One 
Reactor, and Raid on the Sun.  Each one has strengths and weaknesses the others do not.  By far the best 
work on the overt, covert, and diplomatic work done before the strike is Shlomo Nakdimon’s First Strike.  
This book is a translated version from the original in Hebrew, Tammuz in Flames.  A newer version, in 
Hebrew, is in print.  The new version does not use fictitious names and elaborates on details the first could 
not.  It is not currently in English, so it will not be included.  This chapter will also not introduce the varied 
conspiracy theories that follow a subject such as this.  Instead, it will focus on known quantities/actions to 
determine success or failure of those actions.   
20Very similar to the way this thesis is presented.  The author went to Israel and accomplished interviews 
and this thesis presents new information received in Israel, but while spreading the new information, the 
thesis is also an academic route to present information for Israel. 
21From: Nakdimon, First Strike. page 63,79,114,115,115,125,126,131,132,133,and 147. 
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‘conspiracy of silence’…France violated the French constitution on 
banning French (of Israeli descent) workers inside France based on 
Iraqi pressure.   
1977-1978 “Media revelations, domestic and foreign, forced the French 
government to admit that it did intend to supply Iraq with enriched 
uranium.” 
March 1980 “Prodded by a barrage of Israeli reminders, the United States made an 
indirect attempt to induce the Italians to pull out of the project.  
Information leaked to the New York Times and the Washington Post by 
U.S. intelligence agencies recorded that Italy was selling advanced 
nuclear equipment to Iraq, as well as training Iraqi engineers and 
technicians at its nuclear centers.” 
March 20, 
1980 
A London newspaper reported:  Next year, Iraq will be capable of 
manufacturing a nuclear bomb-with the assistance of France and Italy.  
France provides the enriched uranium, Italy: the know-how and 
technology.” 
Summer 1980 Osiraq was a matter of life and death to the Israeli and “in the summer 
of 1980 Israel gave a public declaration of intentions, although it was 
not an official one 
July 1980 “U.S. media published a startling declaration by President Carter:  The 
United States would not attempt to impose it views upon states with a 
nuclear capability-such as France- with regard to the Mideast.” 
July 7, 1980 “At a cabinet meeting, committee members “called for a propaganda 
campaign to alert public opinion in the world at large and in France in 
particular.” 
July 15, 1980 In an interview with the German Die Welt, the director general of the 
Prime Minister’s office said, “Israel cannot afford to sit idle and wait 
till an Iraqi bomb drops on our heads.” 
July 20, 1980 “The first public mention of a possible Israeli air strike at al-Tuwaitha.  
That day’s Boston Globe cited observers discussing a worst case 
scenario to predict that Israel could launch a pre-emptive strike to put 
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the reactor out of commission.” 
September 
1980 
“Israel’s campaign against the Iraqi nuclear program had hitherto been 
conducted behind closed doors.  But the international media were given 
various signals of Israel’s resolve to deny Iraq a military nuclear 
option.” 
Table 1.   Overt Israeli actions against Iraqi Nuclear Program 
 
2. Covert Methods  
 Any group or nation attempting covert action by its very nature does not advertise 
its intentions or results.  Normally, the results are attributed to a particular group after 
lengthy classified investigation.  However, this does not mean that nation or group 
actually accomplished the task.  Undoubtedly, Israel accomplished many covert actions 
while attempting to prevent an Iraqi nuclear weapon.  Some listed below may be their 
handiwork, while others may not be tied to Israeli action.22 
 
April 6, 1979 The “French Ecological Group” claims responsibility for exploding 
both reactor cores in La-Seyne-sur-Mer.  The French authorities never 
caught the group, but European authorities attributed the strike to the 
Israeli Secret Service, Mossad.   
June 13, 1980 Yehia al-Meshad was murdered in his hotel room in Paris.  The only 
witness was Marie-Claude Magal, a French prostitute.  She, too, was 
murdered less than one month later.  The scientist was in France to 
oversee the delivery of the first shipment of nuclear material for Iraq.  
The international media pointed fingers immediately at Mossad, but 
French authorities were unconvinced. 
July 25, 1980 Iraq’s Ambassador to France revealed an Israeli plan to strike Iraq’s 
nuclear reactor in an effort to sabotage Iraqi nuclear efforts.  He 
condemned this planning harshly stating Iraq’s nuclear efforts were for 
peaceful purposes only. 
August 7, 1980 Three bombs exploded at the Italian company SNIA Techint, the 
                                                 
22From: Nakdimon, First Strike, page 101,120,122,123,137, and 181. 
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company responsible for manufacturing the hot separation labs Iraq 




Multiple threatening letters were sent to scientists and technicians 
involved anywhere in the process of enabling Iraq’s nuclear capability.  
The Committee to Safeguard the Islamic Revolution signed all of the 
letters.   
January 20, 
1981 
London Daily Mail reported the Iraqi government caught and executed 
ten suicide attackers before they accomplished their mission inside 
Osiraq.  Additionally, investigators found and dismantled two ten-
pound bombs before any damage was done to the reactor complex.  
Regardless of who was truly responsible for this group, Israel received 
credit for the attack.   
Table 2.   Covert Israeli actions against Iraqi Nuclear Program 
 
3. Diplomatic Means 
 Israel exerted seven years of diplomatic pressure on nations around the world in 
the attempt to prevent Iraq from getting the Osiraq reactor.  France was the primary 
recipient of a majority of the diplomatic pressure from Israel.  Israel also approached 
Italy and West Germany on the issue.  The most important part of Israel’s diplomatic 
effort is the sheer number of attempts Israel made to convince France to abandon its 




“The Israeli Foreign Minister, Yigal Alon, paid a working visit to Paris 
as the draft Franco-Iraqi agreement reached its final stages of 
completion…In his talks with the three main pillars of the French 
administration, Pres. Giscard, Premier Chirac and Foreign Minister 
Jean Sauvagnargues, Alon conveyed Israel’s concern over the 
possibility of Iraq’s misuse of the nuclear technology and fuels whose 
purchase it was negotiating with France.  They all gave the official 
French position, though not a party to the NPT, France would continue 
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to behave as though its signature were appended to the treaty.” 
January 13, 
1976 
Israeli Director General for West European Affairs to French 




Israeli Knesset member Dr. Yehuda Ben Meir voiced concerns over 
Iraq’s dealings with France and France’s acceptance of Iraqi offerings.  
Especially in light of the fact that the Soviet Union refused to supply 
Iraq with weapons grade uranium. 
March 30, 
1977 
The new French Foreign Minister, Louis de Guiringaud visited Israel 
and discussed the Iraqi project with similar reassurances to Israeli. 
July 15, 1977 Israeli Ambassador to Paris Gazit called on France to give Caramel fuel 
to Iraq, but France resisted the idea claiming the fuel was untested and 
not the fuel Iraq originally negotiated. 
January 13, 
1978 
Gazit again visits Guiringaud to slow down plans for delivery until the 
Caramel fuel can be tested and substituted for delivery to Iraq.  Again, 
the Frenchman declared this was impossible, as the Caramel fuel was 
not the fuel Iraq originally negotiated.   
October 19, 
1978 
Gazit again visits Guiringaud to question the weapons grade uranium 
issue and ask when France would deliver it to Iraq. 
January 1979 Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan visits French President Giscard and 
Premier Raymond Barre.  Barre placated Dayan about Iraqi intentions, 
claiming Hussein and Hafez al-Asad had given up the idea of 
destroying Israel. 
July 28, 1980 Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir met with French Ambassador 
to Israel, Jean-Pierre Chauvet.  Shamir told Chauvet, “Israel holds 
France exclusively responsible for the results liable to arise from 
operation of the reactor and misuse of the nuclear fuel.”  Chauvet 
argued, “Acquisition of nuclear arms would be lunacy on the part of 
Iraq.  After all, Israel’s Jewish and Arab populations are intermingled, 
and anyone dropping a nuclear bomb on Israel ran the risk of 
annihilating many thousand of Arabs. 
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August 1980 Dr Meir Rosenne, the new Israeli Ambassador to France visited the 
French Premier about the Iraqi nuclear contract.  He received the same 
answers as those before him 
September 
1980 
Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir visits France’s UN delegate Francois-
Poncet during the UN meeting in New York.  Bolstered by the recent 
Iraqi attack on Iran, Israel expected France to withdraw from the supply 
of weapons grade fuel.  The meeting with the French delegate, 
however, proved worthless.  “Shamir sensed that European cynicism 
left Israel with no choice other than the one it had repeatedly adopted in 
the past:  to take its fate into its own hands 
November 
1980 
Shamir again met with Francois-Poncet and days later with President 
Giscard.  Both of these meetings “were a well-nigh precise rerun of 
everything said at previous meetings.” 
January 1981 Labor party leader, Shimon Peres met with French President Giscard.  
This meeting found no new information favorable to Israel.  Giscard 
told Peres, “The best thing for Israel is a military pact with the United 
States.  Thereby, your security will be guaranteed by the world’s 
number-one superpower.”  Peres replied, “Israel does not want to be an 
American, or a European protectorate.” 
Iran 
February 1977 
Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Alon met with a top-ranking Iranian 
official who served as the Iranian liaison for Israel.  The two countries 
did not have any officially sanctioned diplomatic ties.  The Iranian 
official knew Iraq was working with the French to develop a nuclear 
reactor that could also allow Iraq to produce nuclear weapons.  
However, the official would not join Israel in alerting the international 
community due to fear of highlighting Iranian plans to do the same 
thing. 
Iran 
July 10, 1977 
Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan meets with the same Iranian 
official to inquire if Iran is concerned at all with Iraq developing 




Dec 27, 1977 
Dayan met with the Shah of Iran to brief him on the progress of Israel’s 
peace negotiations with Egypt.  Other Iranian government officials 
informed Dayan of Iraqi nuclear intentions.  Iraqi officials reassured 
Iranians that any nuclear weapon was meant for Israel not Iran.   
Italy 
July 1980 
After Moshe Dayan resigned from Begin’s cabinet, Yitzhak Shamir 
took over as Foreign Minister.  He quickly sent a handwritten letter to 
the Italian Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo in hopes of convincing 
Colombo and Italy to refrain from helping Iraq’s nuclear advance any 
further.  “It is of the gravest when nuclear capability is endowed to a 
regime which achieved power by force, and which is constantly 
sustained by its fierce antagonism toward the Israeli people.” 
W. Germany 
Summer 1979 
Foreign Minister Dayan contacted West Germany to persuade them not 
to produce any components for the Iraqi reactor complex. 
W. Germany 
Sept 4, 1980 
Israeli Ambassador to Bonn, Yohanan Meroz contacted West German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the attempt to have West Germany 
intercede on Israel’s behalf to the French.  Schmidt labored over the 
decision, but eventually decided not to intervene.  He stated, “France’s 
promises must suffice.  I do not see what can be done now.” 
Table 3.   Israeli Diplomatic actions with France, Germany, Iran, and Italy 
 
4. Lack of Results in United States 
 Israeli diplomats worked hard to convince U.S. decision makers to act on their 
behalf.  Israel requested American diplomatic assistance mostly against Iraqi aggression 
and French reticence.  Israel spent almost as much time trying to convince U.S. 
policymakers of the pending danger as they did persuading France to forego its ill-
conceived nuclear proliferation plans with Iraq.  Two events caused Israel to lose faith in 
American proliferation efforts.  After initially vowing to take a hard-line nuclear 
proliferation stance, President Carter reversed plans in July 1980.  He claimed his 
administration would not interfere with other nuclear-equipped countries and their 
Mideast affairs.  Also in 1980, U.S. policymakers decided to continue unfruitful  
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diplomatic approaches with France instead of backing direct Israeli pressure on Iraq.  The 
marked pressure of responsibility weighs different as a superpower concerned with 
systemic problems than as a regional power concerned with survival.24 
 
October 1975 Israeli Prime Minister Rabin urged U.S. Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, to obstruct the French nuclear negotiations with Iraq on 
Israel’s behalf.  Kissinger claimed that he did try to intervene but to no 
avail. 
Winter 1976 Internal debate raged in France over whether or not to supply Iraq with 
military grade uranium or bend to the Carter Administration’s demands 
to use Caramel fuel.  Regardless of the internal fighting, France decided 
to press on with delivery of weapons grade uranium. 
February 1977 Disappointed in Iran, Israel now pinned its hopes principally upon the 
United States, which had, since 1975, conducted a most vigorous 
campaign against dissemination of military nuclear technology.  In 
view of the vigorous U.S. anti-proliferation campaign, it was only 
natural for the United States to attempt to talk Paris into renegotiating 
its agreement with Iraq.”  The Carter administration, elected in 
November 1976, vowed to take a hard-line stance on nuclear 
proliferation.  Election promises pledged sweeping international actions 
against countries promising nuclear technology for sale.  The United 
States slowed down the delivery of uranium and reactors to France and 
Germany.  This slow-down was designed to reflect U.S. policymaker’s 
disapproval of France’s deals with Pakistan and Iraq.  Next, the 
administration encouraged France to supply only Caramel fuel 
(uranium enriched only 20-25 percent) to Iraq.   
March 1980 U.S. media sources criticize Italy and France over selling advanced 
nuclear equipment to Iraq. 
July 16, 1980 Israel Ambassador to the United States met with Secretary of State, 
Edmund Muskie to inquire on the status of U. S. diplomatic pressure on 
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France vis-à-vis the Iraqi nuclear reactor.  Whatever actions were taken 
proved fruitless in stopping France’s cooperation with Iraq.  
Additionally, President Carter made a public declaration that also did 
not help Israel:  “the United States would not attempt to impose its 
views upon states with a nuclear capability-such as France-with regard 
to the Mideast.” 
July 17, 1980 U.S. Ambassador Samuel Lewis visited Prime Minister Begin 
regarding Iraqi nuclear weapons.  Begin urged Lewis to bring the 
matter to the attention of the White House.  Lewis urged Begin to “put 
his trust in President Carter.  “No president has been so concerned and 
so active in trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.  I am certain 
if he can find a way to stop the French, he will do so.” 
July 22, 1980 Israeli Ambassador Evron informed U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
Saunders that France again rejected America efforts to intercede on 
behalf of Israel.  Evron and Israel suspected Washington of putting 
little effort into the developments in Iraq 
July 24, 1980 Ambassador Lewis informs Begin his concerns are on the desk of the 
President and Secretary of State. 
December 
1980 
Results of President Carter’s influence on France and informing 
incoming Reagan administration of Israel’s concerns.  “Was either 
effective?  In both cases, the answer appears to be negative.  There 
must have been some slipup in the transition from one administration to 
the next.  Carter was to explain the omission by pointing out that 
“Reagan appointed his Secretaries of State and Defense ‘at the last 
moment’; consequently, there was no one to receive the information.” 
December 
1980 
“Washington claimed to be under no illusions as the gravity of the 
danger to be expected from Iraq’s possession of nuclear weapons; 
however the Administration held it preferable to pursue diplomatic 
approaches to France and Italy, rather than countenance direct Israeli 
pressure upon Iraq which, the Americans feared, could place obstacles 
before Mideast peace efforts.” 
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April 1981 Secretary of State, Alexander Haig went to visit Prime Minister Begin 
and Foreign Minister Shamir in Israel.  Haig confirmed Israel’s worst 
fears:  The United States had been unable to stop or delay French and 
Italian efforts to equip Iraq with a nuclear reactor and hot cell.  
According to President Carter, “They-France and Italy-are sovereign 
states, just like Israel.  We have intervened with France and Italy-but in 
vain.” 
Table 4.   Israeli Diplomatic Results in the United States 
 
 In October 1980, Israel held two critical cabinet meetings.  On 14 October, Begin 
was in favor of military action, but desired more meetings with French and American 
diplomats.  Shortly thereafter, Israeli Ambassador Evron informed Begin that Iraq now 
possessed 30 kilograms of weapons grade uranium.  Begin’s next cabinet meeting was an 
emergency meeting and he was convinced of the action to take.  According to Nakdimon, 
“Begin now urged the Cabinet to adopt a decision in principle, as recommended by a 
majority of the ministerial team, in favor of destroying the reactor.”25  Begin’s decision 




 After the 1973 war, Israel’s strategic outlook was insecure.  The presence of 
potential Iraqi nuclear weapons only exacerbated the insecurity.  When Israel considered 
the known behavior of Saddam Hussein, now hot on the trail of nuclear weapons, it 
concluded submissiveness was not an option.  Israel elected to attack the Iraqi nuclear 
reactor by overt, covert, and diplomatic means first.  This attack started in 1974 and 
concluded when Begin decided to switch the attack to military means.  In 1981, Israel 
proved it lived by the Begin doctrine.  Once Israeli policymakers saw the other methods’ 




                                                 



























III. THE ATTACK 
The Israeli strike on Osiraq ranks among the most important aerial bombardments 
of the twentieth century.  Every nation seeking to acquire nuclear weapons took notice, 
especially those in the Middle East.  This strike added fuel to a region already ablaze with 
turmoil.  According to Jason Burke, “In 1979…several massive events shook the Muslim 
world:  a peace deal between Israel and Egypt, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and the occupation of the grand mosque at Mecca by a radical 
Wahhabi group.”26  In 1981, Israel’s strike was yet another unsettling event in a region 
still marred by conflict.  This chapter examines how Israel attacked Osiraq, and why the 
means and timing Israel chose for this attack are important.  The chapter first examines 
Israeli political pressures influencing the attack timing.  Next, it examines the alternatives 
Israel had to carry out this strike and the problems involved in each choice.  Finally, the 
chapter describes Israel’s tactical execution of the attack and its immediate strategic 
impact.  The chapter concludes that Israel was the only country in the region that had the 
means to accomplish this demanding strike and chose the timing of the strike primarily in 
response to domestic political pressures. 
 
A. SETTING THE STAGE  
 
Israel can take virtually no action without significant ramifications beyond its 
borders.  It must constantly weigh domestic political demands against regional threats 
and U.S. Middle East policies. 
Israel had no shortage of international and domestic political constraints as it 
contemplated, planned, and executed the strike on Osiraq.  Mired by the first Intifada, 
growing tensions in Lebanon, surface-to-air-missiles in the Beka’a valley, the volatile 
Egyptian peace process, and facing enormous inflation domestically, Israeli policymakers 
found each decision crucially interconnected.  Israel faced Knesset elections in 1981 
amidst these building security concerns. 
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1. Prime Minister’s Role in Foreign Policy 
Israeli Foreign Policy is usually opaque and reactive.  Driven by a myriad of 
factors, the primary author of Israeli Foreign Policy is the Prime Minister.  According to 
Lewis Brownstein, “Since the establishment of the state in 1948, Israeli foreign policy 
decision making has tended to be highly personalized, politicized, reactive, ad hoc, and 
unsystematic.”27  The Prime Minister’s relative power within the Israeli coalitional 
government is the prevailing feature on foreign and security matters. 
The Prime Minister’s control is a function of personality, political authority vis-à-
vis other Israeli political elites, public confidence and publicly perceived security 
environment.  Brownstein implies the formative years of Prime Minister David Ben-
Gurion established the dominant role of the Prime Minister in Israel’s foreign policy 
formulation.  “Improvisation was the rule because it was the only choice.  There can be 
no question that the memory of those years and of the monumental successes…resulted 
in a collective memory on the part of the leadership.  It would be difficult to 
overemphasize the influence of those years on the pattern of Israel’s decision-making in 
foreign policy.”28  Consequently, Israeli foreign policy ebbs and flows primarily with 
Prime Ministerial decisions. 
The Prime Minister’s decisions are responsive to his coalitional government.  
Therefore, domestic political factors within Israel drive foreign policy, counter to 
Brownstein’s theory.  However, the Prime Minister is the pre-eminent member of the 
policy elite with the foremost say on the direction of foreign policy, but his power 
extends only as far as the Knesset allows.  According to Juliet Kaarbo, “Executive power 
is concentrated in the prime minister and the cabinet.  While legitimacy lies with the 
parliament and the cabinet must maintain the confidence of the legislative assembly, the 
power to initiate and carry out policy making is to be found in the cabinet.”  For 
parliamentary democracies Kaarbo contends, “Power and resources are more fragmented  
                                                 
27Lewis Brownstein, "Decision Making in Israeli Foreign Policy: An Unplanned Process," Political 
Science Quarterly 92, no. 2 (Summer 1977): 260. 
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and are divided along policy or ideological party lines.”29  The Prime Minister must 
constantly weigh driving security matters against his resident authority within the 
coalition government.   
 
2. Israeli Political Pressures 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin drove Israeli Foreign Policy starting in 1977.  
His Likud party came to power in Israel after several smaller political parties won enough 
seats in the 1977 Knesset elections to overthrow the Labor majority.  Rabin lost due to 
allegations of corruption, political in-fighting and mediocre policy decisions.  Zachary 
Lockman states, “[Begin’s] new talent and new policies were to replace the stagnations 
and entrenched machinery of the Labor Party bureaucracy which had dominated Israel for 
decades.”30  Begin gained the confidence of the National Religious Party based on his 
uncompromising foreign policy stance. 
Israeli Foreign Policy in 1981 reflected the hard-line attitude of Prime Minister 
Begin.  Indeed, Begin kept his hard-line policy direction throughout his time in office.  
He could remain relatively sheltered in his foreign policy for several reasons.  According 
to Brownstein, “Israel has no independent ‘think tanks’ or councils where academics and 
government officials can come together to exchange views.”31  In addition, the Likud 
party had virtually none of the academic communication links the Labor party possessed.  
Nor, did the Likud party foster any interaction among academia and government 
decisionmakers.  The cabinet remained moderately sheltered and the Prime Minister was 
one-step further secluded than his cabinet.  Hence, Menachem Begin deserved his 
reputation as an autocratic leader who rarely sought advice from his cabinet. 
 
3. Domestic Political Timing of the Attack 
Domestic political factors within Israel affected many Foreign Policy directives.  
Although Begin kept his hard-line policy posture, he could not act with impunity.  
According to Melvin Friedlander, “because Begin enjoyed only a narrow majority in the 
Knesset those right-wing groups and their representatives in the cabinet possessed a 
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virtual veto over government decisions.”32  A junior party, the National Religious Party, 
established foreign policy as an area of influence under its coalitional agreement with 
Begin and the Likud party.  This junior party demonstrated its power in 1979 during 
negotiations with Egypt.  According to Kaarbo, “the autonomy talks were the second part 
of the Camp David Peace Treaty.  The junior party…in coalition with Likud was 
successful at getting hard-line conditions adopted for these talks in May 1979 and 
subsequently deadlocking them.”33  Therefore, domestic political factors were the 
primary influence on Israeli foreign policy 
Israel had a Knesset election scheduled for November 1981.  The Labor party, 
lead by Shimon Peres, was gaining ground on Begin’s Likud party.  Prime Minister 
Begin faced difficulties from unrest in Lebanon, dissatisfaction over the Palestinian issue, 
and a severe economic crisis.  Inflation in Israel was over 120 percent during 1980.  
According to Zachary Lockman, “The Begin government, on the advice of such 
luminaries as Milton Friedman, has revised long-standing Labor policies that subsidized 
consumer goods, protected local industry, encouraged exports and controlled currency 
exchanges.”34  This economic predicament combined with the increasing frustration over 
security issues did not bode well for the Likud party. 
In May 1981, Begin lagged behind Labor party leader Shimon Peres in voter 
polls.  Although the Labor party offered no significant change to policies enacted by 
Begin, public opinion saw Menachem Begin as ineffective.  His political capital was in 
decline and a military action could bolster his hard-line reputation.  In late 1980, 
Lockman guesses, “Begin might choose to gamble on a major military adventure, perhaps 
against the Syrians and Palestinian forces in Lebanon.  Other scenarios are also 
possible.”35  Indeed, Begin readied plans for striking Osiraq as pressure of the Knesset 
election mounted. 
Begin’s desire to solidify his political position by a strike on Osiraq coincided 
with a strong opinion on Israeli defense measures.  Indeed, from the outset of his tenure 
as Prime Minister, Begin revealed concern over the Iraqi nuclear program.  However, 
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Begin held strong memories of atrocities done to the Jews from World War II.  Shlomo 
Nakdimon states, “But above all, what shaped Begin’s course, and his personal 
philosophy, was the Holocaust -- that national calamity in which his own father and 
mother perished, as did most of his family.”36  He saw the Iraqi nuclear program as 
another potential means to destroy the nation.  In late 1977, Begin issued clear guidance 
within his cabinet that no belligerent states in the region could threaten Israel with 
nuclear weapons. 
 
4. The Political Costs of Osiraq 
A strike against Osiraq would serve multiple purposes.  A successful strike could 
sway voters to view Begin as a decisive man of action willing to buck world opinion to 
protect Israel.  Additionally, a strike destroying another potential holocaust device before 
it could be unleashed on Israel matched Begin’s personal philosophy.  If the strike was a 
failure, Begin stood no chance at retaining his role as Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, Begin believed Peres would opt for diplomatic means over action 
against Iraq.  Shimon Peres was close friends with French President Francois Mitterrand, 
who opposed French involvement in Iraqi nuclearization.  Four years of diplomatic 
exertion to prevent France from delivering a nuclear reactor to Iraq, however, yielded 
only failure.  In addition, Begin believed Peres would not risk launching the strike even if 
diplomatic efforts fell short.  Prime Minister Begin, therefore, saw this state of affairs as 
solely his responsibility.  It was his job to protect Israel’s right to exist, but time was 
running out - for him and for Israel. 
The strike on Osiraq came about in this background of intense domestic political 
pressure and steady Iraqi nuclear advance.  The domestic political payoffs for Begin 
offered significant rewards compared to the risks.  Thus, Israeli domestic political 





                                                 




The government of Israel possessed several means of attacking the Osiraq reactor.  
Prior to June 1981, Israeli policymakers primarily used diplomatic pressure to preempt 
construction of the Iraqi reactor.  They pressured many nations, but mainly France and 
Italy to prevent them from supplying Iraq with the Osiris-type reactor and the fuel to run 
it.  Italy also supplied technical training to Iraqi scientists and a specially designed 
shielded laboratory called a hot cell to extract plutonium and handle radioactive material.  
The hot cell was a particularly telling purchase.  It allows technicians to extract and 
harvest bomb-grade fuel.  It could have no other purpose for Iraqi technicians.  Israel’s 
diplomatic coercion was its first line of defense against an Arab bomb, and it failed. 
 
1. International Legal Factors 
The implications of the strike were legally intimidating.  According to McKinnon, 
“The Israelis expected Iraq to charge that any military action would be illegal, a violation 
of international law, and would therefore be considered an act of aggression.”37  
However, the Iraqi regime never signed a peace agreement with Israel and refused to 
recognize Israel as a nation.  Iraqi decisionmakers repeatedly confirmed their policy of 
aggression towards the “Zionist entity.”  Thus, Israeli policymakers considered the strike 
legal based on the wartime status of the two countries. 
Other International law attorneys claim the strike legality based on Israel’s right 
to anticipatory self-defense.  Anticipatory self-defense is defined as the entitlement to 
strike first when the danger posed is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means 
and no moment for deliberation.38  Several decisionmakers to claim the strike was legal 
due to the overwhelming nature of nuclear weapons. 
Anthony D’Amato, a well-respected International Law Professor at Leighton 
University, however, claims neither of these reasons made the Israeli strike legal.  Israel 
had no right to a legal strike in an illegal war (as D’Amato claims the shaky relationship 
between Israel and Iraq was at the time of the strike).  D’Amato also notes that Article 51 
                                                 
37Dan McKinnon, Bullseye One Reactor (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1988), 88. 
38Anthony D'Amato, "Israel's Air Strike against the Osiraq Reactor:  A Retrospective," International and 
Comparative Law Journal 10, no. 259 (Dec 1996): p. 261. 
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of the United Nations Charter (the provision that includes the self-defense clause) only 
allows action “if an armed attack occurs.”39  D’Amato declares the strike was legal 
because Israel acted for the international community as a surrogate on the attack.  If 
international law is designed “to create the precondition for peace and human rights,”40 
then the law provides the international community a right to act upon any aggressive state 
willing to use nuclear weapons as blackmail. 
Israel’s action against Iraq gave the world relief from this potential global Iraqi 
threat.  Regardless of the legal reasoning, Israel pressed ahead undaunted by the 
repercussions that would follow the attack. 
 
2. Risk versus Reward 
Israeli planners weighed the risks and rewards of each method of attack on 
Osiraq.  Once overt, diplomatic, and covert intelligence operations failed to produce 
results, Israeli policy makers had two basic military choices for destroying the Osiraq 
reactor:  a military raid with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) commandos in the lead or a 
precision aerial strike with the Israeli Air Forces (IAF) in the lead. 
In 1977, Begin and his cabinet contemplated an attack against Iraq.  At that time, 
Defense Minister Ezer Weizman approached Israeli Air Force Chief of Staff, David Ivry 
with a proposal:  plan and practice a long-range aerial attack of greater than 650 nautical 
miles.41  Weizman, a pilot and father of the modern Israeli Air Force, knew the IAF could 
complete the mission.  Ivry worked hard to prove his mentor correct.  Using the most 
advanced platform the IAF possessed, the F-4, Ivry foresaw great risk but a mission that 
was not impossible.  Ivry had several missions flown to determine the true distance an 
appropriately loaded F-4 would fly.42  The risk appeared great in 1977, but still within the 
realm of possible. 
 
 
                                                 
39Ibid. 
40Ibid.: p. 262. 
41Personal Interview with Retired IAF Chief of Staff, General David Ivry 1 August 2004. 
42Personal Interview with Retired General Avraham Barber, 1 August 2004.  General Barber flew the F-4 
and helped verify the F-4’s inability to fly the long route.  It would take a refueling over hostile territory to 
stretch the F-4’s range.  The risk increased incrementally with additional aircraft and the necessity of these 
aircraft to refuel. 
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3. Decision Against Commando Raid 
The Israeli military had several commando teams available to attack Osiraq.  
Israel’s military was familiar with complex commando operations.  In 1976, Israeli 
commandos completed a complex raid on Entebbe, Uganda, freeing trapped Israeli 
hostages.  However, a raid deep into Iraq would face significantly different challenges 
than the Entebbe raid.  IDF planners focused on the three main parts of a Special Forces 
operation:  the insertion, the operation, and the extraction.  Insertion and extraction were 
difficult due to Osiraq’s location greater than 1000 kilometers from Israel and surrounded 
by open desert.  This would require a combination of large helicopters, heavy airlift, 
light-attack helicopters, and a multitude of logistics components.  The operation at the 
reactor also would have serious risks.  Israeli planners expected casualties among their 
commandos, the Iraqi guards, and a large number of international scientists in Osiraq.43  
At a minimum, well over 200 people would participate in a ground raid.44  Additionally, 
maintaining complete secrecy with many participants would be difficult.  Planners 
concluded the risks of launching a multifaceted ground raid would far outweigh its 
benefits and Israeli policy makers would not accept such a narrow margin of success. 
 
4. Decision on Air Strike 
Israeli planners concluded the best option was to assign the IAF with a precision 
strike mission directly against the core of the reactor.  According to Amos Perlmutter, 
“The total destruction of the nuclear reactor would in that case be achieved at the lowest 
risk to human lives and the smallest damage to Israel in terms of world public opinion.”45  
The IAF Planning Branch gathered all available information on the Osiraq reactor.  This 
tasking gave Colonel Aviem Sella, chief of the planning branch, the opportunity to prove 
airpower’s central role in security of the small state.  In 1980, the IAF had approximately 
650 airplanes, most of which were second and third generation fighter aircraft.46  Based 
on number and type, the IAF was the third best Air Force in the world and arguably, the 
most experienced in modern tactical jet warfare.  In the late 1970s, the Israeli government                                                  
43Personal Interview with Retired IAF Chief of Staff, David Ivry, 1 August 2004.   
44Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 86. 
45Ibid. 
46Second and Third Generation fighter aircraft exhibit more advanced avionics, engines, and weapons 
respectively.  An example of first generation jet fighters is the F-86/F-100.  Second generation:  MiG-
21/23/F-4 and Third Generation: F-15/16. 
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spent over 50 percent of its defense budget modernizing the IAF.  Sella and the IAF took 
the Osiraq raid as the opportunity to justify the air force’s budget allocation. 
By 1980, the IAF had several different airplanes it could employ against Osiraq.  
Israel possessed the A-4N Skyhawk, the KFIR C-2, the F-4 Phantom, the F-15 Eagle, and 
the F-16 Fighting Falcon.47  The Skyhawk and the C-2 were Israel’s primary air-to-
ground delivery platforms.  However, they lacked the range to reach Osiraq without 
refueling.  They also lacked speed for an effective egress from the target.  The Phantom 
barely had the range to reach the target and would risk two lives (pilot and weapons 
systems officer) during the sortie.  However, it was Israel’s only means of delivering 
precision weapons on target at the time.  The Eagle and Falcon were Israel’s newest 
aircraft and the only third generation fighters in the region at the time of the strike.  These 
airplanes could fly the sortie without refueling.  Furthermore, both had advanced Inertial 
Navigation Systems allowing them to fly long distances without the need for ground-
based navigation aids.  The IAF had the right tools to accomplish the mission. 
 
5. Employment Considerations 
Operation Babylon, the code name for the Osiraq strike, was a simple, well-
planned operation.  The IAF Planning Branch chose non-precision weapons delivered by 
third generation aircraft to strike Osiraq.  In choosing this option, the IAF planners kept 
focus on their primary task:  absolute destruction of the Osiraq nuclear reactor.  Their 
choice of weapon and delivery platform ensured the best odds of meeting this objective.  
Their ability to remain focused on a specific mission is the critical part of the Israeli 
planners’ professionalism.  Israeli planners rejected several tactical options based on the 
overall goals of the operation.  For example, the F-4 Phantoms’ standoff weapons could 
minimize potential losses by not exposing Israeli aviators to enemy Anti-Aircraft 
Artillery (AAA) and Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) surrounding Osiraq.  If inclement 
weather obscured the reactor, however, the ability to guide the precision munitions to the 
target would decrease.  The resulting strike would be less effective than a non-precision 
weapon delivered by a professional aviator in a smart machine.  Given Israeli sensitivity 
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to loss of life, it is remarkable military planners were given this option by government 
officials.  Therefore, Israeli military and government planners made the choices that gave 
the mission the best chance of success. 
 
C. LAUNCH THE FLEET! 
 
Israel was the only nation in the region with the ability to plan, practice, and 
execute this mission.  Israeli tacticians were planning the mission even before the arrival 
of its second squadron of F-16s, which would be equipped with under-wing fuel tanks.48  
To be successful, each phase of the mission called for detailed maps, navigation routes, 
weather data, aircraft performance charts, bomb fuse timing, release angles, target area 
flows, and contingency plans.  This meticulous planning began in 1977, four years prior 
to the attack. 
 
1. The Plan 
The plan for Operation Babylon remained a secret even from those practicing for 
the mission.  All were aware of the fuel and time constraints of the secret mission without 
knowing the actual target.49  Other than cabinet members Begin consulted on the 
decision, only a handful of military members knew the complete details of the mission.  
Initially, only three of the men in the F-16 formation knew Osiraq was the target.  Details 
about the pilots in the F-15 formation remain classified.  However, it is safe to assume 
less than a handful of pilots knew of the actual target.  In this manner, Israeli 
decisionmakers limited the risk of spilling secrets that could potentially endanger the 
strike’s success.  According to Amos Perlmutter, “It is estimated that at least 80-100 
                                                 
48External tanks attach under the wing and fuselage to extend the range of the aircraft.  Once the pilot 
depletes the fuel in these tanks, they are jettisoned to decrease the overall drag of the aircraft.  This 
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49Personal Interview with Retired Colonel Dov “Doobi” and Michal Yoffe at their home in Israel, 5 August 
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who knew of the target.  Ramon was responsible for the fuel planning and Raz and Nachumi were the flight 
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people knew in advance of the intention to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor at some time 
and that a smaller number had knowledge of the precise day in advance once it was 
finally decided.”50  In this manner, the secrecy surrounding Operation Babylon secured 
the chance Israeli fighters would begin their attack as a surprise. 
 
2. Practice…Practice…Practice 
Pilots involved in the strike practiced over nine months before the actual attack.  
Israel is a small country approximately 210 nautical miles from North to South and 
approximately 45 nautical miles from East to West.  According to McKinnon, “Most 
combat flights in Israel are less than an hour long.  It is 68 miles to Damascus from 
Ramat David, so long flights just are not part of the Israeli fighter pilot’s regimen.  It took 
a lot of retraining in the skills of max-endurance flying for an Israeli pilot to convince 
himself to remain airborne for nearly three hours.”51  The low-level route to the target 
would take more than 90 minutes.  However, the true stress lay beyond the extraordinary 
length of the sortie. 
The pressure point in the mission was the target run and the crucial pull up to 
safe-arming altitude.  At this point, the pilots exposed the jet to ground fire, yet had to 
concentrate solely on aiming the jet for weapon delivery.  The two-thousand pound 
bombs used to destroy the Osiraq reactor had slightly delayed fusing to increase the 
cratering effect against the reactor dome.52  The explosion of this type bomb extends 
vertically 2800 feet and horizontally 3400 feet within nine seconds of impact.  Israeli 
safe-arming altitude was 3800 feet.  This meant any bomb released below this altitude 
would come off the jet unarmed since it held high potential to destroy the airplane that 
just dropped it.  The key to hitting the reactor successfully was the rapid shift from 
climbing flight (to get above safe-arming altitude) to nose-low stabilized on the target.  
According to McKinnon, “The Israeli pilots practiced and practiced and practiced so they 
could handle the mission so swiftly that their apex was less than 5000 feet above the 
ground and they could virtually drop the bombs with their eyes closed.”  Moreover, to 
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practice visual identification of a target, McKinnon states, “They all practiced dive-bomb 
targeting on an Israeli radar dome site in the Negev.  It realistically portrayed the reactor 
dome.”53  This practice allowed Israeli pilots to limit their exposure in the target area and 
quicken the intervals between their attacks.  After more than nine months of practice, the 
IAF was prepared for Operation Babylon. 
 
3. Execution 
Operation Babylon launched from Etzion Air Base.  Starting on Friday 5 June, 
Israel staged six F-15s and eight F-16s at Etzion Air Base in the southeast part of the 
Sinai desert.  These airplanes staged into Etzion early to avoid suspicion.  Monday was 
Shavuot holiday and most Israelis expected limited military operations during the holiday 
break.  The pilots flying in Operation Babylon stayed together 5-7 June in makeshift 
quarters waiting to carry out the mission.  The briefing outlined intricate details of the 
flow of the mission.  It covered every conceivable contingency operation, including how 
to handle ejection over Iraq.  Months of practice made the tactical details of the mission 
seem mundane.  IAF commander Major General David Ivri and IDF Chief of Staff 
General Raphael Eitan attended the brief to support the mission first hand.  After the 
brief, the pilots stepped to their aircraft. 
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over King Hussein’s Yacht
 
Figure 2.   God’s Eye View of the Strike  
 
The level of professionalism displayed by each member of the strike team 
reinforced the reputation of the IAF.  The ingress to the target lasted one hour and thirty-
three minutes.  The aircraft flew in a relatively close formation at approximately 360 
knots and 100 feet above the desert floor.  No radio calls or radar emissions, which could 
tip enemy outposts to the coming attack, came from the formation of F-15s and F-16s.  At 
the briefed locations, the F-15s split into two-ship formations, turned on their radars and 
climbed to cover the F-16s.  Approaching the initial point, where the F-16s would make 
final preparations to strike the target, the final two F-15s climbed away from the strike 
formation and turned on their radars and external electronic counter-measure pods.  
These aircraft served the dual purpose of protecting the F-16s from hostile aircraft as well 
as hostile search radars.54  Shortly thereafter, the F-16s spread their formation out for 
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proper target spacing.  Each two-ship arrived over the reactor as the explosion from the 
last formation subsided.  In less than two minutes, Israeli F-16s dropped more than 
fourteen metric tons of ordnance around the center of the sixty-foot reactor.  According to 
Perlmutter, “In all, sixteen Mk84 iron bombs were dropped on the reactor.  The accuracy 
of the bombing, considering the IAF used no smart bombs, was astonishing.  All but two 
were direct hits within thirty feet from the center of the target.”55  The strike on Osiraq 
unfolded precisely as Israeli tacticians planned. 
The battle damage assessment revealed the success of the mission.  Israel most 
likely used in-flight video tape recorders (VTRs) to assess the reactor’s destruction.56  
According to McKinnon, the tapes from aircraft number seven and eight reveal the 
reactor dome completely caved in and a destroyed cooling pool.57  However, Perlmutter 
claims a specially equipped F-15 flew by the reactor after the bombing on a special 
reconnaissance pass to verify the damage.  Regardless of how Israel verified the damage, 
the Israeli fighters destroyed the Osiraq reactor. 
 
Figure 3.   A HUD Image Showing the Initial Explosion of the Osiraq Reactor 
 
 
                                                 
Bombmaker, Khidhir Hamza, noted severe electronic interference moments prior to the Israeli strike.  For 
the most technical account of the strike read McKinnon’s work, Bullseye One Reactor.  
55Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 125. 
56After: "Osiraq and Beyond," Air Force Magazine, August 2002. 
57Personal Interview with Colonel Retired Dov “Doobi” Yoffe on 5 August 2004.  Israel used the HUD 
film of number six, Col Iftach Spector, to verify Osiraq’s destruction.  Spector was the only IAF pilot to 
miss the target.  He misidentified the dome on his roll in to the target and subsequent maneuvering brought 
his aircraft perilously close to the dome as the delayed fuses of the first four aircraft detonated.  
Fortunately, his aircraft filmed the explosion as he corrected his flight path.  Although his bombs missed, 
he provided valuable information for Israel with his HUD film.  The HUD film of number seven and eight 
reflect this damage also, but not as vividly as Spector’s film. 
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4. Reinforced IDF Dominance 
Criticism of the strike covers important details, but neglects the most critical 
factor shaping this Israeli success.  They each overlook the root cause of success:  Israeli 
tacticians employed each weapon system in a well-suited mission.  The IAF used the F-
15, designed for long-range detection and air superiority, in its optimal role:  protecting 
strikers as they dropped their munitions.  Similarly, the IAF used the F-16 in its optimal 
role as a strike fighter against heavily defended targets.  Israel was the only nation in the 
region that possessed these aircraft and tactical knowledge about their optimal use. 
News of the strike came out of Israel on 8 June 1981 and had immediate domestic 
and regional implications.  Begin received the political boost he envisioned.  It also 
disheartened Israel’s enemies and reinforced the perception of IDF dominance.  The 
strike also produced immediate international ramifications.  Both the United Nations 
(UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) condemned Israel strongly for 
the strike.  Only U.S. involvement forced these agencies to stop short of punitive actions.  
Israel’s Osiraq strike was a resounding vote of no confidence on IAEA safeguards.  
According to Shai Feldman, “Whatever else might be said about the Israeli attack on the 
Osiraq nuclear reactor near Baghdad, we now know that there is at least one effective 
anti-proliferation policy in the world.”58  Menachem Begin and Israel predicted harsh 
responses from the international community.  They interpreted every condemnation short 
of punishment as leaders “going through the motions”59 of international diplomacy. 
 
 
5. Domestic Perceptions 
The strike emboldened the Israeli population and carried Menachem Begin to a 
Knesset election victory.  According to Shai Feldman, “Primarily, its brilliant execution 
enhanced the credibility of Israeli deterrence.  The 7 June operation was a further 
indication of Israel’s superior military capabilities.”60  The biggest dilemma the strike 
alleviated was the short-term likelihood for a nuclear equipped Iraq.  Thus, as an 
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60Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence : A Strategy for the 1980s, 126. 
40 
immediate strategic impact, the strike strengthened Israel’s military standing, bought time 




Israeli decisionmakers planned the Osiraq strike to obtain short-term gains, but 
the long-term consequences are now unappealing.  According to Perlmutter, “The short-
term price Israel had to pay for the operation was rather minimal.  In early June 1982, 
Begin, Sharon, Eitan and other supporters of the raid could look back at the decision and 
conclude that the events of the passing year had proved it to be highly justified.”61 
Domestically, Begin gained substantial political capital within Israel.  In addition, the 
strike set Iraqi nuclearization back by ten years.  However, long-term implications may 
counter these short-term benefits.  According to Feldman, “The raid increased the Arabs’ 
motivation to accelerate their efforts in the nuclear field.  Such acceleration is regarded 
by the Arabs as a form of resistance to Israel’s perceived intention to maintain nuclear 
superiority indefinitely.”62  In the future, Israel might not have the military capability to 
accomplish another Osiraq.  In essence, the strike on Osiraq was a one-time 
counterproliferation operation for Israel and the global community. 
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IV. EFFECTS AND AFTERMATH  
This chapter identifies the deterrent effects of the Israeli strike on the Osiraq 
reactor and assesses the political impact of the preventive raid on the Iraqi nuclear 
weapons program.  The chapter first examines Israeli political actions following the strike 
and analyzes Israel’s perception of the mission.  Then it reviews empirical results of the 
strike from the Iraqi perspective, as well as political factors facing the Iraqi government 
after the strike.  Finally, the chapter identifies the repercussions of preventive military 
strikes to provide policymakers lessons related to future preventive military actions. 
 
A. SETTING THE STAGE 
 
Tactically, the strike on Osiraq was a brilliant success.  However, Israeli leaders 
needed confirmation of the reactor’s destruction.  Several avenues existed to validate 
battle damage.  The foremost means was the amount of secondary explosions reported by 
the aviators after their bombs hit the target.  Next was the Video Tape Recordings (VTR) 
of the F-16’s Heads-Up-Display (HUD), which showed the bomb impacts.  Israel 
normally had the means to receive classified U.S. satellite imagery, which would allow 
verification of the strike, but U.S. imagery was restricted after the attack became public.  
Months later, when Israel finally received U.S. satellite imagery, it verified that 14 of the 
16 bombs dropped on the Tammuz reactor struck within 30 feet of the center of the 
reactor structure.63  Achieving tactical surprise for all 14 Israeli fighter aircraft was a 
success in its own right.  Striking the target with seven of eight aircraft, however, 
exceeded the Israeli leaders’ expectations. 
 
1. Domestic Factors in Israel 
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin perceived the strike as vital to shield 
Israel from Saddam Hussein’s growing military capability.  Begin believed the Iraqi 
leader was a new “Hitler.”  The Prime Minister referred to Hussein as the “Butcher of 
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Baghdad.”64  In 1979, Iraq’s military had an army of 190,000 men, 2,200 tanks, and over 
400 attack aircraft.  These conventional forces were formidable, yet Iraq was building 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.  Although Hussein was threatening Iran 
during this time, Begin saw Hussein as the foremost regional threat facing Israel.  Thus, 
he justified his decision to strike based on the threat a nuclear equipped Iraq posed to 
Israel.  News of the mission’s success produced celebration at the Prime Minister’s 
house.65 
Domestic political considerations, more than the Iraqi threat, obligated Begin to 
order the strike.  At the time of the strike, Begin was both Prime Minister and Defense 
Minister.  Pushing for Begin’s retirement, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman planned to 
succeed the Prime Minister at the Herut Party conference of 1979.66  However, Begin 
maintained his position and further consolidated his power within the party.  This forced 
Weizman to resign his position as Defense Minister.  Improving his domestic political 
support was critical for Begin as a decision on the fate of Osiraq drew near (initially the 
strike was to happen in October 1980).  When word on the strike spread among Israeli 
policymakers, however, “the October decision was no longer the property of a select 
few.”67  Labor party members were urging political caution on the hope diplomatic 
relations with France would yield results.  High-ranking military advisors and 
intelligence officials also were opposed to the necessity of military action.  In a secret 
memo to the Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, the Labor Party leader, stated, “I speak as a 
man of experience…what is intended to prevent can become a catalyst.”68  To these 
advisors the preponderance of evidence suggested Iraq would not have enough material 
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to field a nuclear weapon until 1985 at the earliest.  Begin saw the critical part of the 
equation not in terms of uranium but in domestic political capital. 
 
2. Knesset Elections 
The Likud party controlled the Knesset during June 1981, but elections were 
scheduled later that year.  According to Perlmutter, “Begin saw the reactor as a clear and 
present danger.  He also knew that it represented a political weapon which could be used 
against him in more ways than one.”69  Begin limited the decisionmakers on the strike to 
three:  himself, Finance Minister Ariel Sharon, and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir.  
Sharon and Shamir held similar strong opinions on Israel’s defense vis-à-vis Iraq.  Begin 
warned his cabinet about taking action against the reactor lightly.  Ordering a strike of 
this magnitude was a high-stakes international and domestic political gamble.  If the 
strike failed the Likud and Begin would certainly lose the election, but most importantly, 
Iraq would still have a viable nuclear program.  Conversely, even if the strike succeeded 
the Israeli population might see the raid as only a political ploy taken to bolster Begin in 
the polls.  Therefore, regardless of the strike’s outcome, the result politically was far from 
secure.  Most politicians take action designed to keep them in power.  But, Begin later 
stated, “If we had not done this, if we had not acted, I would never have forgiven 
myself.”70 
The Likud party won the following election and consolidated power.  The Labor 
party attempted to spin the Osiraq attack as a political display, yet a professional poll 
taken the week of the strike showed a five percent increase in Begin’s approval rating.  
Governmental support also increased to its highest levels since Begin took office.  
Perlmutter states, “The contest was no longer between Likud and Labor but between 
Begin and Peres…the 1981 elections centered on a personality contest:  Peres won the 
TV debate – but Begin won the votes.”71  The resulting elections favored Likud by 46 
seats to 40 for Labor in the 120-seat Knesset.  The other seats went to lesser parties.  , 
Many of these lesser parties (National Religion, Shinui, and Shas parties) however, 
backed Likud during this time.  Begin’s government used action to voice its position 
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clearly on nuclear weapons proliferation in the region.  The election results illustrate the 
general Israeli approval of the Osiraq attack. 
 
3. International Factors After the Strike 
International political ramifications were significant for Israel, but did no lasting 
damage.  Other than Iraq, Egypt stood the most to lose from the Israeli attack.  Egypt 
strongly reprimanded the Israeli attack, but it could not afford to be “weak” toward the 
Zionist entity.  In reality, Egypt could not afford the perception among other Arab nations 
it had abandoned the Palestinians.  In this case, Israel stretched the loosely held 
boundaries between itself and Egypt by striking three days after the conclusion of the 
Sadat-Begin summit of Ophira.72  The Egyptian press raged against the Israeli attack.  In 
addition, Egypt cancelled joint Israeli-Egyptian delegations discussing commercial 
ventures and agricultural planning altogether.  Likewise, many European nations joined 
the international community in condemning the strike, but took no action to penalize 
Israel.  The Israeli strike hurt France, in particular.  The technology transfer from France 
to Iraq was lucrative and over one-quarter of Iraq’s $3.5 billion defense spending went to 
France.  During the strike, Iraq used French and Soviet equipment in its air defenses and 
use of these systems did not stop the attack.  Further highlighting their equipment’s 
inability in combat against U.S. military equipment would not increase global estimation 
in their value.  After the attack, France’s flow of material and technology to Iraq would 
slow but would not cease and diplomatic channels with Israel never closed. 
The United States joined the global outcry against the attack, but took no long-
term action against Israel.  The United States took three short-term actions against Israel.  
After issuing a strong verbal condemnation against the strike, the Reagan administration 
suspended the delivery of four F-16s to Israel.  The State Department and Congress also 
officially initiated an investigation of the legality of the Israeli raid vis-à-vis the Arms 
Export Control Act.  This act limits Israel’s employment of United States military 
hardware only to defensive acts.  The media within the United States was extremely  
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outspoken against the raid, however.  All of the attention paid to Osiraq quickly took a 
lesser spotlight in July 1981 as Israel bombed Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
headquarters in Beirut. 
 
4. IAEA Aftershocks 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initially drafted a resolution 
calling for Israeli removal from the IAEA.  However, according to Shai Feldman, “The 
draft was opposed by the American delegation which argued ‘that punitive action against 
Israel would do great harm to the agency and to global nonproliferation.”73  The result 
was a resolution recommending Israeli IAEA suspension.  This suspension passed but did 
not punish Israel significantly.  Israel expected much worse.  In essence, Israel’s strike on 
the Osiraq reactor was a long distance vote of “no confidence” in IAEA safeguard 
measures.  To the IAEA, this represented a possible Pandora’s Box, with other threatened 
nations taking up arms to strike the nuclear facilities of their enemies.  Due to United 
States intervention, the IAEA did not expel, nor did it apply devastating new sanctions 
against Israel. 
The Israeli attack forced the IAEA to interact with the UN Security Council.  For 
the two regimes, this interaction was a significant transformation in the international 
order.  According to David Fischer, “the Board sent a report to the Security Council after 
the Israeli bombing...however, it was the Gulf War ten years later that brought the IAEA 
for the first time into direct consultation with the Council.”74  The first report condemned 
Israel:  ten years later the IAEA called for the complete dismantling of Iraq’s nuclear 
facilities.  As non-proliferation became critically important for international regimes, the 
IAEA looked back on actions in 1981 as a starting point.  Israel’s vote of no confidence 





                                                 
73Ibid.: 136. 
74David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency:  The First Forty Years (Vienna: The 
Agency, 1997), 432. 
46 
5. United Nations Resolutions 
The United Nations (UN) published a Security Council Resolution censuring 
Israel for the attack.  However, this Resolution called for no punitive action against Israel 
since the United States again resisted such actions.  Surprisingly, Iraq did not force a UN 
vote to expel Israel when it had the chance.  According to Ghassan Bishara, “Iraq’s 
willingness to extricate the United States from a terribly embarrassing vote against the 
rest of the Security Council members is still puzzling.”75  If Iraq forced an embarrassing 
veto on the U.S. Ambassador, however, it would alienate Washington’s Arab allies as 
well as the United States in the process.  Such an action would not portray Saddam 
Hussein to other Arabs as a potential pan-Arab leader, as he so strongly desired.  Another 
reason Iraqi delegates did not force the U.S. delegation to veto was the relative warmth of 
the relationship with the United States at that time.  The United States required a regional 
Arab ally, and Iraq, deep into the war with Iran, needed aid from the United States.  Shai 
Feldman states the results, “The Iraqi–U.S. cooperation in drafting the post-operation 
U.N. Security Council Resolution was a natural consequence of this requirement.”76  
Thus, Israel managed to escape with a very meager reprimand considering the gravity of 
its actions against Osiraq. 
 
B. BOMB DAMAGE 
 
Damage to the Tammuz 17 reactor complex at Tuwaitha was significant.  
Verifiable information about BDA open to international scrutiny was, at best, sketchy 
from the Government of Iraq.  Unclassified reports indicate Iraq had two French nuclear 
reactors, one Russian nuclear reactor, and several reprocessing facilities at Tuwaitha.77  
There were several technical laboratories surrounding Osiraq, the largest of the French 
reactors.  Osiraq, named after the Egyptian god of the dead, was the only Iraqi reactor 
capable of significant plutonium production.  After the Israeli attack, Osiraq was no 
longer capable of producing plutonium. 
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Figure 4.   After Effects of Osiraq Reactor 
 
1. Physical Results at the Osiraq Reactor 
Iraq lost incredible nuclear assets in the Israeli strike on Osiraq (Figure 4).78  
Khidhir Hamza was a senior Iraqi scientist trained in America at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology.  He was a nuclear weapons designer in the Iraqi scientific community.  
His office was in the Tuwaitha complex.  Hamza states the results of the Israeli strike: 
“The place was a disaster.  The reactor dome was completely gone.  The reactor cavity, 
kind of a swimming pool where the fuel rods were cooled, was cratered beyond any hope 
of repair.  The uranium, however, was safe.”79  Yet, there were larger problems than the 
physical destruction of the reactor.  Primarily, Iraqi scientists were now unable to use 
plutonium in developing the necessary fissile material for a bomb.  The next most 
available route was to enrich uranium through a centrifuge process.  This process was 
more time consuming and wrought with expensive, sophisticated, and scarce scientific  
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material.  The Osiraq reactor alone had cost the Iraqi government $300 million dollars to 
purchase from the French government.  Iraq was now funding two wars, one against the 
Iranians and the other against nuclear non-proliferation. 
 
2. Immediate Strike Implications 
The strike on Osiraq punished Iraq more in time than financial penalties.  Milan 
Vego states, “Battlefields wax and wane in combat, but lost time is irreplaceable.”80  
Iraqi scientists began courting French officials in the effort to purchase Osiraq in the 
early 1970’s.  The official purchase did not occur until 1974.  Safeguarding radioactive 
material and manufacturing highly technical equipment take enormous quantities of time.  
Thus, Tuwaitha was not operational until five years after purchase.  According to 
Feldman, “There is no doubt that Osiraq’s destruction slowed the pace of Iraq’s nuclear 
program.  Even if Iraq could replace its loss with an identical reactor, which now seems 
likely, some 3 to 4 years will have been gained.”81  Eight Israeli F-16s destroyed five 
years of work in less than 90 seconds.  On 8 June 1981, Iraq was once again years away 
from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 
After the strike on Osiraq, Iraqi scientists faced new obstacles in constructing a 
nuclear weapon.  They were only able to obtain “Caramel” fuel; a lower grade 
radioactive material enriched only 7-10 percent and used singly for experiment 
reactors.82  Yet, the strike on Osiraq did not destroy all of Iraq’s enriched Uranium.  
However, the scientists with expertise to use this Uranium were the most difficult piece 
to replace.  Iraqi scientists, studying abroad, sought shelter from Saddam Hussein and 
refused to return to Iraq.  Those who remained took the risk of losing their lives when 
traveling internationally.  Yehia al-Meshad was murdered while in Paris attempting to 
buy enriched Uranium from the French government.  The French police attributed the 
murder to robbery but Iraqi scientists suspected Israel’s intelligence community as the 
culprit.83  Regardless of who accomplished this, fear slowed the Iraqi scientific 
community significantly. 
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3. Domestic Factors in Iraq 
Domestically, Saddam Hussein faced political ramifications from the strike, but 
none that jeopardized the government.  The Iraqi population was largely unaware of what 
Tuwaitha held.  More importantly, the war with Iran offered a public diversion.  Saddam 
Hussein’s Ba’athist government formed around the inspiration of a strongman ruling an 
equally strong-willed people.  Thus, much of Hussein’s political legitimacy focused on 
the leader’s strength in conflict.  Yet, the Iraqi government did not launch a media attack 
immediately decrying the illegitimacy of the raid as they did in the Gulf War and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Instead, Israel was the first to announce the strike.  Uri Bar-
Joseph states, “Under these circumstances it was quite clear that the official Israeli 
announcement concerning the surprise attack came as the second shock for Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.”84  Politically, the attack appeared to Hussein as a setback in prestige 
and resulted in a 72-hour blitz against Zionism from Radio Baghdad.  Bar-Joseph 
continues, “It was still interesting to note that Saddam Hussein himself kept quiet for ten 
days after the raid.  As leader of the Iraqi people, he probably knew that some other 
reaction apart from the propaganda campaign against Israel was needed.”85  Iraq, 
however, was in no position to oppose Israel militarily. 
 
4. Arab Responses 
Arab sentiment against the Israeli attack was evident but did not convert into 
military action against Israel.  The Iran-Iraq war divided Arab sentiment in the early 
1980’s, but once again, the Israeli strike unified the Arab world against the ‘Zionist 
entity.’  Syria had much to gain from destruction of Iraqi nuclear weapons.  Iraq’s Ba’ath 
party has always labored against Syrian Ba’athists.  However, Syria vehemently declared 
Arab solidarity of action against Israel.  Likewise, Saudi Arabia publicly condemned the 
Israeli strike calling for Arab unity.  In addition, King Khalid offered to contribute funds 
to rebuild the Iraqi reactor.  According to Uri Bar-Joseph, “It [the attack] was seen as an 
insult to the whole Arab world.  This was the genuine feeling and perception of every 
Arab.  The image of the Israeli pilot as Superman – similar to the one that existed 
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following the Six Day War – had also been reinforced upon the Arabs.”86  Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat also publicly condemned Israel.  Fresh from the peace accords 
with Begin, he needed to limit his isolation from the Arab community.  According to 
Feldman, “Egypt attempted to return to inter-Arab activity by-among other things-aiding 
Iraq in its war with Iran.  Thus, some military aid had been extended by Cairo to 
Baghdad.”87  Privately, all Arab states recognized Iraqi aims at hegemony and saw a 
nuclear-equipped Iraq as a destabilizing force in the region.  The Arab nations needed a 
nuclear-equipped state to offset Israel’s nuclear ability, but did not want Iraq to be that 
state. 
The global uproar against the Israeli attack resulted in some compensation for 
Iraq.  In the early 1980’s, the Reagan administration was in search of a regional ally 
(other than Israel) to replace Iran.  In turn, Iraq was desperately in need of equipment and 
funding during the conflict with Iran.  The Osiraq attack acted to stop Iraq’s nuclear 
proliferation, but simultaneously open diplomatic avenues for the United States.  Every 
meeting with United States officials reinforced Saddam Hussein’s stature and prestige to 
Iraqi citizens and brought some form of reimbursement.  However, global aid and Arab 
solidarity could not replace the time and money Iraq lost during the strike. 
 
C. THE VALUE OF PREVENTIVE STRIKES 
 
The overarching question remains:  did Iraq lose all interest in obtaining a nuclear 
weapon after the Osiraq strike or did they redouble their nuclear efforts?  The strike 
devastated Iraq’s nuclear program, decimated the regime economically, and hardened 
Saddam Hussein’s desire to become the leader of a nuclear nation.  In his case study 
review, Patrick Morgan links deterrence to controlling conflicts by using appropriate 
threats and indicates that in spite of taking the correct deterrence steps, a motivated 
challenger can attack.  The motivation of the challenger is a decisive issue in the level of 
success a deterrent relationship will have.  Peter Lavoy indicates that a deterrence 
association between states can be offensive as well as defensive in nature.  “The case 
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studies show that many new actors plan to use unconventional deterrents both to support 
the status quo and to change it.”88  Iraq clearly desired nuclear weapons as an 
unconventional deterrent against the Zionist entity.  Thus, in this thesis deterrence 
includes offensive actions such as preventive strikes and allows the examination of 
motivating factors in both Israel and Iraq. 
 
1. Short Term Value 
The policy of the Government of Iraq was a direct reflection of Saddam Hussein’s 
private desires.  His regime implemented his policy without question.  Khidhir Hamza 
mentions his unflinching obedience to illogical orders due to the deadly consequences of 
disobedience.  According to Morgan, “No wonder it was difficult to deter Iraq…the 
trouble was the coalition promised to damage Iraq’s economy and society…that was 
entirely ‘bearable.’  The way to deter Iraq was to have promised to kill him [Saddam 
Hussein] or remove him from power – the only things he really cared about.”89  Power 
and regional hegemony motivated the Iraqi leader.  In this manner, much of Iraq’s coarse 
foreign policy was a reflection of its dictator’s desire for power. 
Saddam Hussein’s attempt to obtain nuclear weapons was a natural extension of 
his need for influence.  The Israeli strike on Osiraq occurred before the reactor went 
critical.  Thus, the bomb grade Uranium was still available to Iraqi scientists.  According 
to Khidhir Hamza, they salvaged 25 kilograms from the rubble.  Within six years after 
the strike, Hamza estimates Iraq had twelve thousand scientists and technicians working 
to develop a nuclear weapon.  Economically, following the strike, Iraq poured an 
estimated ten billion dollars into its, now buried, nuclear facilities scattered throughout 
Iraq.  These scientists were able to work relatively uninterrupted for 4 years before Desert 
Storm hampered their efforts.  They developed viable shaped charges, manufactured their 
own explosive caps, and cast their own Uranium sphere.  Although Iraqi scientists 
accomplished significant milestones in design technology, they lacked an enriched core 
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able to sustain a significant explosion.90  It was only a matter of time before Iraqi 
scientists obtained this fissile material.  However, Desert Storm interrupted this attempt 
and further thwarted the Iraqi dictator’s plan for nuclear weapons.  Thus, the Israeli strike 
on Osiraq delayed Iraq’s nuclear development, but did not dissuade Hussein’s search for 
“the bomb.”   
In attempting to dissuade Iraq, the Israeli government did not view Hussein as 
irrational.  An intelligence dossier on Hussein correctly reported him as a power-hungry, 
calculating risk-taker.  Lavoy states, “The common assumption is that we [the deterrers] 
are rational, they [the challengers] are constrained by culture.”91  Israel chose to restrain 
Saddam Hussein by attacking one of his instruments of power.  While this action did not 
discourage Hussein from his desire for nuclear weapons, it did buy time for Israel in the 
conflict.  One condition of successful deterrence is having a proper perspective of the 
challenger.  While the Israeli preventive strike on Osiraq served several short-term goals 
for Israel, it had long-term repercussions for the world. 
 
2. Long Term Value 
The Israeli preventive strike solidified a long-term change in the deterrence 
landscape.  The strike was the first example in the Middle East of a precision aerial attack 
on another nation’s nuclear facilities.  This Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) opened 
new realms of possibility based on a modern air force’s capability.  According to 
Morgan, “Why is this a revolution?  The best answer is that it should greatly affect the 
way force can be used.  Force has usually been a blunt instrument.”92  Morgan claims 
nations with precision strike ability will now find deterrence much more appealing.  This 
is incorrect.  Precise force is still force.  Military action should be the last resort any 
statesman chooses, due to its life and death nature.  As quick and surgical as any 
precision strike appears prima facie, the long-term effects lie within the deterrence 
relationship of the states and not the effects of the weapons.  Eliot Cohen states: “The 
days of Osiraq-type raids on a single, easily located, and above-surface nuclear facility 
are over.  Secrecy, camouflage, deception and dispersion will make preemption a far 
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more extensive and uncertain operation than ever before.”93  Osiraq was a one-time good 
deal for the Israelis.  The lessons since Osiraq prove Cohen correct so far.  The long-term 
effects of any surprise attack will produce the following results:  “harder” targets and 
more staunchly antagonistic enemies.  This does not mean this author condemns military 
strikes to serve the state’s purpose.  On the contrary, a military strike should be 
devastating and used when a nation is prepared to follow with additional military action. 
Domestic political aspects often override significant international political factors.  
This was the case with Israel in June 1981.  Every intelligence indicator Begin received 
indicated Israel had time to mitigate Iraq’s nuclear reactor by other than military means.  
Begin saw the attack as a political launching pad and his ideological responsibility to the 
people of Israel.  Concerning domestic issues Morgan states, “there is recurring evidence 
that governments, elites, and leaders are often barely moved by general deterrence threats 
that they ought to take into account.  Often short-term thinking, not attuned to larger 
implications and potential consequences of what they are considering, drives them.  They 
seem caught up in domestic political or ideological preoccupations.”94  Strategically, 
Israel has a lack of Geostrategic depth and extreme sensitivity to loss of Israeli lives.  A 
nuclear weapon in the hands of a staunch, determined enemy provoked strong reactions 
in Begin’s government.  Morgan also states, “Top decision makers rarely understand the 
military preparations made to deal with crises, resulting in force postures unsuitable for 
deterrence situations.”95  Such was not the case in Israel, Begin and his trusted advisors 
were all very familiar with the Israeli Defense Force’s capabilities.  The ideological and 
domestic political factors drove Begin for an early June strike. 
 
3. Asymmetric Effects 
Military actions after a preventive strike require significant resolve by the 
deterrer.  Historically, the Government of Israel has a poor record of accomplishment in 
deterrence.  Morgan chose Yair Evron’s deterrence case study on Israel.  Evron 
concludes, “Deterrence failed even though Israel was militarily superior, its resolve was 
clear, and it communicated threats clearly.  The failures arose out of Arab domestic 
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political pressures and the impact of crisis on Arab decision making.”96  Later in the case 
study Morgan confirms, “Nuclear weapons are not irrelevant but not dominant.”97  The 
first lesson in the aftermath of Osiraq is nuclear weapons were nice (and expensive) 
distracting mechanisms with little significant effect.  By striking Osiraq Israel 
demonstrated its resolve to deny nuclear weapons in Arab nations in accordance with its 
policy.  However, the nature of this attack is “bearable” according to Morgan.  It did not 
threaten the full sovereignty of Iraq.  Thus, Saddam Hussein continued developing 
nuclear weapons clandestinely.  Morgan states the second deterrent principle, “Where the 
threat is less than destruction of the regime, it is possibly ‘bearable’ so deterrence is less 
likely to work consistently and may have to be sustained by fighting, perhaps 
repeatedly.”98  The last principle is a corollary of the second; that the challenger must be 
willing to employ the threat on the deterrer in order to prove credibility.  Thus, most 
deterring nations limit the threat in order to facilitate credibility.  This succeeds in 
making the deterrence “bearable.”  Morgan states this last lesson, “deterrence will more 
often involve not just threats but force and will be less likely to work quickly, requiring 
repeated applications of force in repeated confrontations.  This will make deterrence 
expensive, difficult, and hard to sustain over a long period, markedly eroding its 
effectiveness against opponents determined to outlast it.”99  The Osiraq reactor 


















Preventive strikes are relatively simple to plan and execute.  They make a global 
statement immediately.  However, the repercussions of these strikes are lasting and 
costly.  Currently, the United States can see the truth of this implication daily.  
Policymakers eagerly looked for a precision Navy Tomahawk or TLAM to meet 
momentary political needs in the Middle East several years ago.  Now the United States 
is seeing the long-term consequences.  The conclusion of Planning the Unthinkable 
encourages United States decision makers to be prepared.100  A one-size-fits-all precision 
strike course of action will not produce good results. 
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Israel is willing to enforce nonproliferation in spite of stepping beyond 
international standards and regimes.  The attack on Osiraq did counter Iraq’s nuclear 
program in the decade following the strike.  However, the strike also virtually guaranteed 
the need for future military action against Iraq.  This chapter reviews a summary of 
research findings and offers policy recommendations for U.S. policy toward Israel and 
future counterproliferation actions. 
 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
 After the 1973 war, Israel’s strategic outlook was insecure.  The presence of 
potential Iraqi nuclear weapons only exacerbated the insecurity.  When Israel considered 
the known behavior of Saddam Hussein, now in search of nuclear weapons, it concluded 
passivity was not an option.  Israel elected to attack the Iraqi nuclear reactor by overt, 
covert, and diplomatic means first.  This attack started in 1974 and concluded when 
Begin decided to switch the attack to military means 
 In October 1980, Israeli decision makers held two critical cabinet meetings.  On 
14 October, Begin was in favor of military action, but desired further work in the 
diplomatic arena.  At Begin’s next cabinet meeting, an emergency session, he was 
convinced of the action to take.  He implored his cabinet to vote for the destruction of the 
reactor.  Once Israeli policymakers saw the other methods’ ineffectiveness, they quickly 
elected to strike.  After gaining approval, Begin’s decision was simply a matter of when 
to strike the reactor.  In 1981, the timing was right and Israel proved it lives by the Begin 
doctrine. 
 Israeli decisionmakers planned the Osiraq strike to relieve short-term pressure, 
but the long-term consequences are uncertain.  The strike set Iraqi nuclearization back a 
decade, and domestically, Begin gained substantial political capital within Israel.  
However, continuing uncertainties may counter these short-term benefits.  Two of these 
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uncertainties are an intense desire among most Arab states to counter Israeli military 
dominance by going nuclear and motivation for the prestige associated with being in the 
nuclear club.  In the future, these factors may suggest military means to accomplish 
another preventive strike are significantly reduced as Israel copes with future nuclear 
proliferators who also learned lessons from the strike on Osiraq.  In essence, the strike on 
Osiraq was a one-time good deal for Israel and the global community. 
 The policy implications from a single military action taken over twenty-three 
years ago still apply today.  Preventive strikes are simple to plan and execute compared to 
major military actions on the national strategy scale.  Moreover, in spite of their 
simplicity, they make a global statement immediately.  Media attention serves to 
highlight the importance of the problem.  In the long-term however, a preventive strike 
such as Osiraq, may reinforce a state’s desire toward nuclear proliferation.  Such was the 
case with Iraq.   
 I have three findings.  First, future preventive strikes against nuclear targets will 
be less successful.  Other nations seeking a nuclear option also have learned valuable 
lessons from the strike on Osiraq: dispersal and redundancy of facilities.  Thus, while a 
future strike may hinder nuclear plans momentarily, the time will not be measured in 
years unless followed with more strikes.  Second, the media backlash after a strike will 
serve as an impetus to radicalize the proliferator’s motivation toward going nuclear.  
Third, decision makers should make every attempt to work within the confines of current 
global constructs for stability.  Regimes such as the IAEA and U.N. require cooperation 
for strength.  By working within international norms, nonproliferation may take longer 
than through other means, but it stands a chance to be far more effective in the end. 
 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
I have two policy recommendations.  First, U.S. policymakers should recognize 
the consequences of diplomatic failure on the process of nonproliferation.  Israeli 
decision makers attempted to counter Iraq’s nuclear plans diplomatically for seven years 
before concluding a military option was the only appropriate solution.  Israeli 
policymakers justified the strike based on their perception of apparent U.S. vicissitude 
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toward Iraq’s nuclear proliferation.  U.S. diplomats had many more tools at their disposal 
to allay Israeli fears that went unused. 
Currently, U.S. policymakers, in consensus with global partners, France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom condemned Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts and 
called for international action.   
The latest collaboration produced a joint statement encouraging Iran to stop its 
nuclear proliferation and open all facilities to IAEA inspection.  While there was no 
automatic trigger for the IAEA to alert the U.N. Security Council if Iran failed to comply, 
the diplomatic pressure exerted through the regime was a good start.  Coordinating 
activities between the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council is the best remedy to stop 
nuclear expansion.   
As the global hegemon, the next decision point for U.S. policymakers is balancing 
the weight of nonproliferation system management wisely against valuable alliance 
considerations.  Decision makers should make every attempt to work within the confines 
of current global constructs for stability.  If this means taking diplomatic and economic 
actions against proliferators or pushing Israel to abandon the Begin doctrine, then quick 
decisive action through IAEA or U.N. auspices with full United States backing are the 
best options.  U.S. leaders must weigh the potential misperception between slow, steady 
pressure to reverse proliferation, and Israel’s view of state survival.  If U.S. policymakers 
fail to take decisive action, Israeli decision makers may once again take preventive 
military action 
The second policy recommendation is a one-size-fits-all precision strike course of 
action will not produce good results.  However, if U.S. decision makers see the need to 
explore the preventive strike option – on Iran or the DPRK- the factors covered in this 
thesis warrant consideration.  The U.S. military is the best in the world at Global 
precision targeting on demand.  Nevertheless, striking a target, regardless of the level of 
damage inflicted, does not alter the motivating factors behind its existence.  Before, 
choosing a military option, leaders should confirm that all other options are exhausted 
and remain ineffective.  Along with the initial strike, military planners should plan 
contingency follow-on strikes and outline triggers for when to launch these strikes.  The 
strike on Osiraq proved deadly, but did not prevent Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from 
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rebuilding with vigor after the shock of the first strike subsided.  Diplomats should 
arrange to coordinate incentives for stopping proliferation in conjunction with follow-on 
strike actions.  These incentives may reduce the radical tendencies of a nuclear 
proliferator when leaders see the benefits of not going nuclear. 
Finally, regardless of the outcome of the November 2004 Presidential election, 
the next administration should continue pressuring Iran via the IAEA and U.N., continue 
working in consensus with global partners, and pay close attention for Israeli signs of 
independent military action.  The Osiraq attack is the benchmark for military 
counterproliferation actions.  The world will judge the success of future strikes in 
comparison to the Israeli military action of 1981.  However, a better standard of success 
should be the dedication a nation devotes to nonproliferation via diplomatic means.   
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